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Abstract
We consider a network of interacting agents and we model the process of
choice on the adoption of a given innovative product by means of statistical-
mechanics tools. The modelization allows us to focus on the effects of
direct interactions among agents in establishing the success or failure of the
product itself. Mimicking real systems, the whole population is divided into
two sub-communities called, respectively, Innovators and Followers, where
the former are assumed to display more influence power. We study in detail
and via numerical simulations on a random graph two different scenarios:
no-feedback interaction, where innovators are cohesive and not sensitively
affected by the remaining population, and feedback interaction, where the
influence of followers on innovators is non negligible. The outcomes are
markedly different: in the former case, which corresponds to the creation of
a niche in the market, Innovators are able to drive and polarize the whole
market. In the latter case the behavior of the market cannot be definitely
predicted and become unstable. In both cases we highlight the emergence
of collective phenomena and we show how the final outcome, in terms of
the number of buyers, is affected by the concentration of innovators and by
the interaction strengths among agents.
Keywords: Innovation diffusion, Agent-based, Collective phenomena,
Innovators, Random network
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1. Introduction
During the recent years, along with the growing diffusion of new meth-
ods of communication, social networking and people direct interactions have
been increasingly analyzed by economic research, with new interesting re-
sults.
In particular, as stressed in [20], a new aspect which emerged is that the
classical hypothesis of atomic agents has to be updated in order to allow for
interactions among the individuals themselves. As emphasized in the classic
study by Katz and Lazarsfeld [22], mass communication needs to rely on
individuals to work because they do constitute the basis of the information
network and the one-another-influence of decision-makers is a key process in
information diffusion [see 26, 13, 15, 6, 8, 30, 4]. Additionally, what came
out from their research (that has been drawn on and improved by Gale-
otti and many others, see [17, 19, 18, 1]) is that the influence process on a
community is largely determined by population heterogeneity [31, 9]: infor-
mation is mediated by mass media to opinion leaders (or Market Mavens)
and by them to other different social classes, through inter- and intra-groups
communication networks. In other words, we deal with a society stratifi-
cation where each stratum has a different role, from collecting information
to creating the network of relations the information will be spread through.
Without losing much generality and for the sake of clarity, in most works on
this topic, stratification has been simplified in just two classes, often called
Innovators, i.e. the opinion leaders, and Followers, i.e. anyone else [7, 12].
In this paper we want to highlight how such inhomogeneity and direct
communication can affect the sales performance of a given innovative prod-
uct. Hence, we consider a market composed by Innovators and Followers
who can influence each other through direct (not market mediated) interac-
tions [14]; as a result of such interaction they decide whether to buy or not
to buy the product. In order to account for the different nature of agents
we assume that the interaction strength, that is the influential power, de-
pends on the agents involved. In particular, Innovators, being trend setters
and displaying large cohesiveness, will be associated to a higher interaction
strength. We also notice that, the degree of Innovators’ leading role may
depend on the nature of the innovative product considered. Indeed, we
distinguish between two possible scenarios.
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In the former, referred to as no-feedback scenario, the innovativeness of
the product is sharp (e.g. determined by remarkable technological improve-
ments) and easily identifiable by consumers; these points make the product
non comparable with any other one available. Also, this kind of innovative
product is typically characterized by a scarce reachability, due e.g. to high
prices, limited number or poor spreading, in such a way that only a part
of the population (i.e. Innovators) can afford to buy it and a market niche
is established. Under these circumstances Innovators are very cohesive and
not prone to abandon the novelty, being negligibly affected by the orien-
tation of the remaining market. On the other hand, Followers, not having
direct access to the product are significantly influenced by Innovators and,
eventually, attracted by possible discounts, start to acquire it. As an exam-
ple we can think of Apple Inc.: as they always try to create very original
products, they establish brand new market segments. In this scenario we
show that Innovators may act as a traditional advertisement, cost-free for
the producer and whose effectiveness is directly related to the influence ex-
erted; if the influence is strong enough, Innovators can lead most of market
to follow their opinion.
In the other scenario, referred to as with feedback, the innovation intro-
duced can be easily and quickly reproduced, in such a way that other brands
can produce analogous items. Under these conditions everybody can try the
novelty and mutually influence each other. Hence, in this case, the influ-
ence on Innovators due to Followers can be non negligible and the former,
although being initially buyers, may change their mind. For example, this
is the case of functional food products: some consumers do not believe that
the innovation is really worth to be paid for and, moreover, the innovation
can be so simple (e.g. adding vitamins) that after a short period all the
main producers have adopted it. Our results suggest that such situations
lead to an unpredictable market behavior, where reproducibility of product
failure or success is unlikely, except for borderline cases.
In both scenarios, we observe the emergence of collective phenomena,
leading to a global orientation of the market, which is typical of social
networks. As a real world example look at figure 1, where the historical
data about the diffusion of CD-ROM and VCR players are shown: for both
products there is a certain point in time where the market abruptly polarizes
and the share of households undergo a steep increase. This kind of behavior
is indeed what is called a collective phenomenon and it is a well studied
property of ferromagnetic systems, by which our model has been inspired.
3
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Figure 1: Diffusion of CD-ROM and VCR players over about 30 years. Both products
experience a rapid growth in diffusion at a given time where the diffusion rate is ac-
cordingly much steeper. Collective phenomena (e.g. imitative interactions among users)
typically underlie this kind of behavior.
We will also show how the final outcome, in terms of the number of buyers, is
affected by the concentration of innovators and by the interaction strengths
among agents and we will highlight the existence of a critical region in our
parameter space where the market is particularly sensitive to small changes
and such information could be very useful for market forecasts.
The paper is organized as follows: in sections 2 and 3 we introduce our
model, its mathematical description and make some remarks on the idea
of modeling social phenomena with statistical mechanics tools; in section
4 we present our numerical results for the two scenarios and compare the
related outcomes. The last section (sec. 5) is devoted to conclusions and
final remarks.
2. Model motivation
In this work we are considering a population where each individual has
to decide between two alternatives and his/her behavior is explicitly affected
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by the previous decisions of his/her acquaintances.
This setting is motivated by many known examples in social sciences
where decision makers influence one another because of limited information
on the problem or because of an inability to process the information that
is available [27]. When deciding about what movie to watch, which restau-
rant to go to or what product to buy, one often has scarce information
to evaluate the alternatives and therefore relies on others suggestions, or
simply pick up the most common choice among the people he/she interacts
with. Even when a large amount of information is available, e.g. to evaluate
new technology or a risky financial asset, one might not be able to process
such information and, again, take decisions based on his/her neighborhood
choices. In other contexts, as the so-called social dilemma or in collective
action problems, the payoff of our decision could depend explicitly on what
others have decided, being higher as many people take the same choice;
or in a technology diffusion process the utility of a single additional unit
may depend on how many of them are already present in the market, i.e.
network effects.
In all these kinds of problem individuals have strong incentives to look
at others’ decisions.
Also the dichotomy of the choice, even if it may appear extremely sim-
plistic, can be relevant in a large number of complex problems: for example
the creation of a political coalition or a referendum vote are extremely com-
plex problems with many possible outcomes but when the coalition exists
or the referendum text has been drafted the decision is essentially a binary
one. Similarly when deciding whether to adopt a new technology or to buy
or not any product, the factors involved could be many but the final decision
can be again regarded as binary.
This entire class of problems is usually referred to as binary decisions
with externalities [27]. Across specific problems the details of the binary
decision and the origin of the externalities can vary; nevertheless, in many
of the applications that have been examined in the economic literature, the
decision can be seen as a function solely of the relative number of agents
that have been observed taking an alternative over the other [27].
Another big issue in many economic or social problems is that the pop-
ulation is often fragmented: it is very common that people do not behave
homogeneously with respect to a certain problem and may interact in dif-
ferent ways. A relevant example is product diffusion processes, where it is
known that the market is divided in two sub-communities, usually referred
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to as Innovators and Followers [7]. These two groups display different at-
titudes with respect to the adoption of novelties and interact differently,
depending on whom they are interacting with. Innovators, because of their
- by definition - more influential behavior, are also usually called the trend
setters of the society. This is the kind of scenario we will keep in mind while
building our model in the next section.
In general, one can think of many different models of society ranging
from purely homogeneous, where each agent has the same number of ac-
quaintances, all of the same kind; to inhomogeneous, where, for example,
the number of acquaintances is a random variable and individuals display
different attitudes. Such social structures can be effectively envisaged by
means of graphs whose nodes represent agents and links between them the
existence of a relationship, which could be acquaintanceship, friendship,
kinship, etc. Several kinds of graph have been proposed in the past as
able to mimic the features displayed by a real population. In particular
random graphs, introduced by Erdo¨s and Re´nyi [16], in spite of not being
considered to be the most realistic models of real-world networks [28], are
often used as their first approximation for combining a stochastic character
with an easy tractability that allows to calculate exactly many interesting
quantities [21, 11, 24].
In the following we will adopt this type of graph and, differently from
previous works [e.g. 29], the dual community structure introduced above.
3. Model description
We consider a society corresponding to a set I of N individuals divided
in two different subsets which we identify as Innovators (II) and Followers
(IF ), such that I = II ∪ IF .
In particular, we define N nodes labeled as i = 1, ..., N such that i ∈ II
for i = 1, ..., NI (Innovators) and i ∈ IF for i = NI + 1, ..., N (Followers),
with II ∪ IF = I and NI + NF = N and therefore N = |I|, NI = |II | and
NF = |IF | (where | · | represents the number of elements in the set). For
any couple i, j we establish a connection with independent probability p.
We call zi the degree of node i, i.e. the number of agents connected with
i. Given the way we build the graph, the distribution of z is known to
be a binomial [16]. Figure 2 represents an example of our model: agents,
represented by dots (Followers) and squares (Innovators), interact whenever
there exists a link between them. The weight of each link depends on the
6
Figure 2: Example of a very small graph. Blue dots represent Followers and red squares
exemplify Innovators. The first are linked with one another by blue straight lines (tuned
by JFF ) while the second community is connected by red zigzag lines (JII); the green
wavy lines link Innovators and Followers together (JIF and JFI). Each agent i corre-
sponds to a status σi and feels an external influence hi. Bonds are uniformly drawn with
probability p. See section 3 for details.
kind of agents the link is connecting: in the figure, different weights are
represented by different line styles.
Each agent of the system has to make a discrete binary choice concerning
the adoption of an innovative product introduced in the market [see 23, 3],
that is each agent can either buy or not buy the product. The state of each
agent is therefore encoded by a binary variable denoted as σ, e.g. σ = +1
(σ = −1) means that the agent is (not) a buyer.
The state of any agent is the result of the interactions he/she experiences
within the society through, for example, word-of-mouth, e-mail exchange or
pure imitation. Moreover the interaction strength between two agents de-
pends on the parts involved: we introduce four parameters JII , JFF , JIF/FI
which represent the coupling strength between two Innovators, between two
Followers and between an Innovator and a Follower respectively (see Sec.
3.1). In our framework one will expect to have high values of JII , small
values of JFF and JIF > JFI , respectively due to the facts that Innovators
are very cohesive, Followers have rather independent behavior and that the
influence of Innovators on Followers (JIF ) is, by definition, stronger than
the vice-versa.
In addition to the mutual interaction between agents, also called herd
effect, it is possible to add a news effect (h) on the population: this will
be able to bias the community towards a given choice and, in the products
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diffusion scenario we are keeping as reference, can be interpreted as an
external advertisement; since these are often targeted, its effectiveness will
in general depend on the individuals it is applied to.
In the following we are going to consider only imitative interactions, as
they are shown to be predominant in several social contexts [10]. As a result,
agents tend to follow their acquaintances decisions and to avoid disagree-
ment, therefore an individual can only tend to imitate his/her neighbors or
to follow the advertisement message. For instance, when deciding whether
to buy or not to buy a given product, an agent (being he/she an Innovator
or a Follower) will look at the neighborhood choices and/or advertising mes-
sages and tend towards the same buying behavior; of course, as mentioned
above, the degree of influence is larger when the neighborhood is made of
Innovators and an analogous scheme applies for advertisement. In a sense,
our model is a “glass society”, where the information about the choice is
visible to all the people in contact and each agent takes his decision by
weighting his/her neighbors’ choices. This model corresponds quite well
to the web communities case, where the preferences of the members are in
general shared with all the friends and are immediately visible. Conversely
in traditional markets the information can be transferred using a direct and
explicit communication as, for example, word-of-mouth, phone calls or mail
exchanges.
To summarize, in our world agents are labeled as either Innovators or
Followers, both have to decide whether to adopt an innovative product and
they are influenced by:
• nearest-neighbors interactions, each individual tend to imitate its neigh-
bors’ decisions
• advertising, that acts on the population as an external force and can
bias people to take a specific choice.
In any case the effectiveness of the interaction depends on the nature of the
agent(s) considered. We aim to study the different effects and strengths of
these two kinds of influence on people behavior, focusing on the context of
products adoption.
3.1. The Hamiltonian as a cost function
Given a set of N agents arranged according to a given topology and the
assumptions discussed above, the whole system configuration is given by
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{σ} ≡ {σ1, σ2, ..., σN} and its status can be described by means of a cost
function or Hamiltonian H({σ}), which reads off as [23, 3]
HN({σ},J) = −
1
N
N∑
i,j=1
i∼j
Jijσiσj −
N∑
i=1
hiσi, (1)
where the first sum runs over all couples of connected nodes (i, j).
In general a Hamiltonian function implicitly contains a complete de-
scription of the system: solving it would lead us to a full characterization of
the model configuration-space and to its evolution equations1. Moreover, if
σi do not explicitly depend on time and hi are scalars (as in our case), the
Hamiltonian also represents the total energy of the system.
By using eq. 1 to describe our model, we are already defining the kind
of interactions that can take place in our system: the former term refers to
direct influence between two agents, while the latter to an external force,
h, that can be exerted on any single node. Furthermore these two different
interactions (Jij and hi) depend on the nature (either Innovator or Follower)
of the agents i and j considered and, recalling that in our model the popu-
lation is divided in two groups, we can label agents in such a way that the
coupling J is a four block matrix and the external field h is a vector, given
by
J =
NI︷︸︸︷ NF︷ ︸︸ ︷

JII JIF
JFI JFF


}
NI
 NF
h =


hI
hF


}
NI
 NF
The assumption that only imitative behavior is taking place means that
every entry of the matrix J has to be non-negative, in this way a configura-
tion where two nearest-neighbors share the same status is more favorable2.
As mentioned above, the Hamiltonian represents a cost function; this means
that, following statistical mechanics prescription, a change in the state of
any agent (σi = −1 → +1 or vice versa) is realized through a stochastic
1However in the case of eq. 1 as in many other interesting cases, there is no simple
analytical solution. This is the reason why for many models, as for ours, the resort to
numerical simulations becomes necessary.
2In the sense that it has a lower energy, as it is clear by substituting in eq. 1.
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process which is more likely the smaller its cost. We therefore adopt a local
dynamic, where the likelihood of a change in the state of a generic agent
depends on the pertaining local cost: a flip σi → σ
′
i = −σi for the i-th agent
corresponds to an energy difference of
∆Hi({σ}, σ
′
i,J) =
σi
N
N∑
j=1
j∼i
Jijσj + 2σihi. (2)
The value of ∆Hi measures the cost afforded by the system to perform
the flip: when all neighbors σj are aligned and in agreement with σi the
cost is large, especially when the corresponding couplings Jij are large (i.e.
when neighbors are Innovators); vice versa, when σi disagrees with the
overall neighborhood, ∆Hi is negative and the flip is expected to be easier.
Thus, in general, the lower is ∆Hi, the more likely is the flip.
Formally we will make the system evolve by means of Monte Carlo (MC)
simulations [25] where, given the magnetic configuration {σ}, the spin-flip
σi → σ
′
i = −σi on the i-th site, extracted randomly, is accepted with
probability
p({σ}, σ′i,J) =
1
1 + e∆Hi({σ},σ
′
i
,J)
. (3)
Therefore the algorithm to make the system evolve is composed of two
different parts: the choice of the node to update, for which we used a
uniform distribution over all the agents, and the probability of the spin-flip,
for which we used eq. 3. The reason why we made this choice is that this
is a well-studied dynamics and it is known, when the interaction pattern is
homogeneous, i.e. Jij = k ∀i, j ∈ I, for driving the system to a well-defined
stationary state [25, 5]. Hence we tested its behavior when the coupling Jij
is a block matrix with non-negative values and we verified that also in our
case this dynamics leads the system to stationary states, with well-defined
proprieties that depend on J and on the concentration of Innovators, defined
as c ≡ NI/N , and with fluctuations that scale like N
1/2
It is worth noting how the flip does not depend on general system pro-
prieties, but generates from the local status of a few nodes, i.e. the selected
node itself and its neighbors. Moreover eq. 3 makes now clear the discus-
sion about the ease of flipping: the lower the cost, i.e. ∆Hi, the higher will
be the probability of flipping and the external parameters Jij regulates the
chances of energetically unfavorable status changes to happen.
The external field h enters the equation as a drift term that does not
depend on the agent’s neighbors but just on its own status and that can,
10
as introduced before, bias the flipping probability independently of other
external parameters and the overall system configuration.
We also define the observable
M({σi}) =
1
N
∑
i∈I
σi , (4)
which provides information about the percentage of the market which has
oriented towards a given choice. For instance, if a certain parameters con-
figuration drives the system to have the 85% of agents to buy the product,
we will have M = 1
N
(0.85N − 0.15N) = 0.70. Evidently M displays upper
and lower bounds, namely +1 and −1 and the same applies separately for
MI or MF , representing the state of the two sub-markets.
The resulting model presents some non-trivial properties related to the
collective behavior of its constituents. For example, as shown in [5], the
model naturally recovers some realistic phenomena such as a logistic growth
for the number of buyers and tipping points. More precisely, given a sym-
metric J, i.e. JIF = JFI , being JII and JFF both small, for a fixed per-
centage of Innovators, if we increase the inter-community communication
we observe that there exists a critical value JcIF , at which the number of
agents sharing the same status (e.g. buyer/non-buyer) abruptly grows. This
behavior constitutes a genuine collective phenomenon due to the intrinsic
communication among agents. In the present work we aim to analyze how
the system behaves under more complex interaction patterns that represent
a better modelization of realistic social systems.
Finally we summarize the main points introduced in this section:
• we model the society by means of an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi random graph, in
such a way that each agent i has a random number of acquaintances
with whom exchanging information
• agents making up the society i = 1, ...., N are divided into two groups,
Innovators and Followers; the interaction strength between a couple
of agents depends on the kind of agents involved
• each agent is endowed with a dichotomous variable σ, which specifies
the status (buy/not to buy) of the pertaining agent
• we introduce a cost function describing the cost and, ultimately, the
likelihood, of a given configuration {σ1, σ2, ..., σN}
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• we defined a dynamic, namely a set of rules according to which the
state of any agents can be modified.
4. Results and discussion
Our analysis is based on numerical simulations performed with Monte
Carlo algorithms, where the dynamic introduced in the previous section al-
lows to attain a stationary state. Then, the average value of observables
such as MI and MF is measured and its dependence on system parame-
ters as well as on the initial configuration is investigated. This allows us
to obtain both phase diagram of the system, namely to distinguish the re-
gions in the parameters space where the model displays a paramagnetic (i.e.
a regime where agents act independently) or ferromagnetic (i.e. a regime
where agents act collectively) behavior. The choice of focusing on the sta-
tionary state follows from the observation that in many situations, ranging
from polls to marketing analysis, relevant global parameters describing the
behavior of large but finite subsamples of the populations are not rapidly
changing on the time scale considered: if the results of the experimental
measurements are stable, then it can be meaningful to analyze the social
system by looking at its equilibrium or stationary behavior.
In our numerical simulations we will reproduce a double-community mar-
ket with Innovators and Followers, where, as traditionally assumed and al-
ready discussed in section 3, the former are very cohesive, while the latter
are more independent. We want to reproduce likely market conditions just
after an innovative product launch, hence we will assume that the initial
status is MI = +0.95 and MF = −0.90: Innovators have already and uni-
formly decided to adopt it, while Followers are still reluctant about it3. We
want to figure out the market conditions that will make the system even-
tually end up in a buyers or non-buyers predominance, as to say a launch
success or failure.
Here, we concentrate on two scenarios: a feedback and a no-feedback
one. As we are going to show in the next subsections, the related emerging
behaviors are markedly different.
Before proceeding we underline that the estimate of a given observable
such as 〈M〉 is taken to be the average over a number of 103 decorrelated
3These initial values of MI and MF correspond to the assumption that 97.5% of the
Innovators and only 5% of the Followers have already decided to buy the product under
consideration.
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states of the system, once the equilibrium regime has been reached and that
the thermalization time and the decorrelation time are taken to be on the
order of 102 MC steps. Moreover, the thermal averages obtained are fur-
ther averaged over different (∼ 100) realizations of the underlying structure,
having fixed the number of agents, the average coordination number (p) and
the populations relative width (c), in order to account for the stochasticity
of the graph; however, in general, statistical errors due to the ’topologi-
cal average’ are significantly smaller than those arising from the thermal
average.
4.1. No-feedback scenario
We want to construct a market with no external advertisement where
JIF , i.e. the influence felt by Innovators due to Followers, is weak, while
JFI , i.e. the influence felt by Followers due to Innovators, is gradually
tuned in order to figure out how the system configuration depends on the
gap between the two. This specific case is likely to occur when the product
under consideration creates a clear niche in the market: its innovation is
recognized as really powerful so that it establishes a new market segment.
In this condition it is natural to think that Innovators adopt the product
and hardly change their mind about it. The interaction parameters are
defined as follows:
JIF = J
JFI = J + γ , (5)
where J is a finite, fixed parameter and γ is tunable and represents the
interaction growth. Notice that the situation is asymmetric.
In Figure 3 (top panel) we can see how the system responds as γ grows,
compared with data from a case with widespread advertisement and no
mutual interaction among agents, that is γ = 0 and h 6= 0. The two cases
are almost overlapping, meaning that Innovators act like an external field
on the remaining system and indeed we observe a similar growth rate; their
cohesive and buying-oriented behavior, without a significant feedback, make
them act as an effective forcing on the whole system.
It is very important to notice that in Figure 3 (top panel), in order to
compare data sets from the two cases, we had to rescale the advertisement
magnitude: the idea is that each Innovator in our system acts like an exter-
nal field on his/her neighborhood and, since we set up a world with a high
density of connections (i.e. high p), they can actually have a big influence on
13
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Figure 3: Upper panel: the total market choice, when a stationary state is reached, for
two values of c. Symbols represent data points obtained by varying γ and assuming
h = 0, while curves represent data obtained by varying h, properly rescaled with Npc
for the comparison. Lower panel: market indicator (〈M〉) derived with respect to c for
both cases. In the inset the data for 〈M〉 are plotted. Simulations are performed with
N = 6000 agents, p = 0.80, JIF = JFF = 10
−4 and JII = 0.05.
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the whole system. Hence to compare data we divided h by the average num-
ber of Innovator neighbors every agent has, i.e. h → h˜ = h
Npc
. This feature
of our model tells us that acting on Innovators visibility, in a market that
is likely to have low to none feedback, we can significantly boost our sales:
it can be sufficient giving any Innovator a weak influence/visibility power,
e.g. viral ads, to obtain market shares at least as strong as with canonical
advertisement but with evident lower costs than TV or magazines ads.
Furthermore, we can study the dependence displayed by the market
indicator 〈M〉 on c, in order to understand how and when acting on the
Innovators percentage can be useful for sales. In figure 3 (bottom panel)
we can see the quantity ∂〈M〉/∂c, that indicates how market share changes
depending on a small variation of the percentage of trend setters in the com-
munity. As it is clear from the figure, the effect due to agent communication
and to widespread advertisement are significantly different: in the former
case ∂〈M〉/∂c shows a peak for low values of c (∼ 1%), while the latter is
close to zero value on the entire range analyzed. This means that, espe-
cially for small values of c, a tiny increase in the Innovators number causes
a dramatic variation in the share of buyers in the market (over 90%), while
for the news case the two quantities are unrelated. These results can be
used to decide for the best strategy of a company, assuming we are able to
understand the market conditions: if we are relying on viral diffusion of our
marketing information, it should be convenient to make investments aiming
to increase the Innovators number up to some percentage point (at 3− 4%
we still have gains of ∼ 10%) while efforts are almost useless if the reference
community already has more than 5% of trend setters.
This whole analysis leads us to conclude that a market like the one we
just depicted behaves in a good predictable manner: a sub-community of
Innovators that receive no feedback about their choices and cohesively adopt
a certain product can eventually lead to the complete polarization of the
population. As we will see in the next section, when feedback comes into
play this deterministic and ordered behavior ceases to exist.
4.2. Feedback scenario and market instability
We want to build a market where, like before, there is no external ad-
vertisement and information about new products is driven only by word-
of-mouth among agents. However, differently from the previous one, now
we allow for feedback interactions: as we increase Innovators vs Followers
communication strength (JFI), the inverse interaction (JIF ) gets stronger
too. In other words, the influence power always remains asymmetric (i.e.
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Figure 4: The total market choice 〈M〉 as a function of J , for fixed c = 0.15, while JII
is taken equal to 0.05 (upper panel) and equal to 0.003 (lower panel). Simulations are
performed with N = 6000 agents, p = 0.80, JFF = 10
−4 and ε = 0.5.
JFI > JIF ) but when JFI is increased, JIF is also strengthened, so that
their ratio remains constant (see eq. 6). In this case, any agent has the
chance to outline an opinion concerning the product so that the Innovators
role is weaker and they can be non-negligibly influenced as well.
More precisely, we consider the following interaction: introduce a new
parameter ε and let
JIF = (1− ε) γ ,
JFI = (1 + ε) γ , (6)
JIF
JFI
=
1− ε
1 + ε
.
Here ε represents a percentage difference of the interaction in the two di-
rections. In the following simulations we will make the value of γ run for
different configurations of c, keeping, just as an example, ε = 0.50 fixed.
It turns out that this setting leads to unpredictable results: for the same
parameters configuration, the market may end up in a product success or
failure randomly.
In Figure 4 we can see the results obtained. We compare the cases for
two different values of JII (0.003 and 0.05): we can clearly observe that if
Innovators cohesiveness is not strong enough, the system, for higher values
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Figure 5: Market success probability in the feedback (ε = 0.50) scenario as a function of
JII and γ; different panels correspond to different values of c. The last panel shows, for
comparison, an analogous market with no feedback. All results refer to a system with
N = 6000 agents and p = 0.80.
of inter-population interactions, became unstable and unpredictable. This
is an effect of the feedback that characterizes this scenario. Indeed, as the
interaction grows Innovators are more exposed to opinions from the rest
of the market that we supposed initially against the new product. On the
contrary, a market where Innovators present very strong bonds among one
another, gives the same results as the study of Section 4.1.
The unpredictability is evidently the key-element of our model in this
scenario. In order to deal with it we study the probability of success of
the market: without a deterministic behavior what we want to look at is
how many times, out of a certain number of tries, a certain market condi-
tion leads to a successful product diffusion. In Figure 5 we represent this
probability for the cases c = 0.05, 0.10, 0.15 and we observe that both JII
and γ play important roles: an increase in γ increases the feedback as well
and makes the success probability undergo a drop from almost 1 to nearly
0; in a similar way, for a fixed γ, there is a value of JII around which the
probability sharply changes. Indeed, for low values of JII Innovators are
not very connected so that they cannot really lead the market; this is true
as far as JII reaches a certain tipping point (that depends also on the value
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of γ) where, instead, their action as trend setters turns out to be successful
in polarizing the market.
The system instability we observe originates from a lack of cohesiveness
of the leading community: when the two populations are opposed with com-
parable strength, the outcome of their interaction is no longer a universal
and reproducible result but heavily depends on the model’s initial specifi-
cation and local topology. In this case how Innovators and Followers are
located and connected one another on the graph become of extreme im-
portance in the establishment of the final opinion of the entire community.
This result can be interpreted as a warning for policy makers about the
complexity of multiple community scenarios.
5. Conclusions
In this work we introduced a model for the behavior of a market com-
posed of interacting agents, when an innovative product is introduced. The
structure of the society is represented by a random graph, whose nodes rep-
resent agents and only neighboring ones are allowed to interact and influence
each other. The likelihood that a given agent will adopt the new product
depends on the number, state and type of his/her acquaintances. Mimicking
real systems, we indeed distinguish between two kinds of agents: Innovators
and Followers, characterized by different attitudes towards the new product
and different degrees of influence with respect to other individuals.
According to the kind of product under consideration, we distinguish
between two scenarios. In the former case, the product determines a real
breakthrough giving rise to a market niche where initially only Innovators
access; because of this they will be particularly cohesive and scarcely af-
fected by the remaining of the market. Under such conditions we found
that, by tuning Innovators influential power, it is always possible for them
to drive market opinions. In other words, they work as a (cost-free) ampli-
fied advertisement.
Conversely, when the innovativeness of the product can be easily and
quickly reproduced by other firms, it is plausible that Innovators feel a
feedback due to the remaining population. Innovators no longer constitute
a separate market but they are integrated in the community and they can
be strongly influenced too. We have shown that this condition gives rise to
non-predictable market results: the system may either succeed or fail for the
same parameters configuration. This behavior suggests a strong sensitivity
of the system about initial conditions.
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Hence, according to the kind of product considered, the behavior of the
market can be dramatically different, ranging from a well predictable system
where the visibility of Innovators has direct impact on the product success,
to a non-predictable one, where acting on Innovators influence may or may
not yield any significant improvement for sales performance.
Among the possible developments of this work we mention the extension
to more inhomogeneous networks as models for the social structure [2].
Beyond the rather homogeneous random graph adopted here, one could
extend the analysis to societies where the node degrees span over a wider
range as in scale-free networks: those graphs display a large number of
nodes scarcely connected and a few nodes, called hubs, with a significantly
large number of neighbors. Whether Innovators are placed on hubs or not
is expected to have crucial effects on the overall behavior of the system.
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